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The contemporary moment provides an acute illustration of the 
dangers of historical amnesia—as if the Trump Administration’s 
policies of exclusion, extremist nationalism, and presidential 
imperialism were singular to ‘now,’ and entirely reversible in the 
next election.  This Article argues to the contrary; that we have been 
down this road before, and the current crisis in immigration and 
refugee policies is the inevitable development of trends of racism, 
including anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism and xenophobia, that have 
only become normalized by the populist resurgence of Trumpism.  
If this premise is correct—that we are experiencing a culmination 
of a historical trajectory—what lessons from past legal-activist 
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mobilization around implementing international law can be applied 
to the present?  Focusing on a few select efforts over time that used 
international law—human rights treaties and other instruments—
and international legal interpretation to litigating refugee and 
asylum claims in the United States, this Article posits that the U.S. 
constitutional framework is inadequate to address the serious 
undermining of immigration and refugee rights.  Although prior 
efforts at incorporating human rights norms have thus far been 
insufficient, more robust and strategic application of international 
human rights norms is urgently needed to seriously challenge the 
migration crisis of our time.  
As support for this premise, it is useful to examine three prior 
periods of significance for the rights of refugees and immigrants: 
the refugee influx from Central America during the civil wars in the 
1980s, the anti-Arab, anti-Muslim refugee and immigrant measures 
during the 1990s, and the post-9/11 Guantanamo litigation.  What 
were some of the key challenges that lawyers and advocates made 
to the worst of the policies in those periods, and how useful were 
international law arguments to those strategies?  
I draw on these examples from the past to illustrate that we have 
been down this road before.  This is not the only time that racism 
and xenophobia have been normalized at the very top of government 
and mainstreamed by Congress and the media.  Concurrently, 
however, there has been a massive response by civil society.  
Thousands of people spontaneously showed up at airports to protest 
the ‘Muslim’ ban, and lawyers volunteered all over the country to 
file habeas petitions to allow non-citizens to enter in defiance of the 
ban.1  So far, the courts have mostly struck down the various 
versions of the Muslim ban, though that litigation is now pending at 
the Supreme Court.2  However, prior efforts to push back against 
similar extreme measures against immigrants and refugees starkly 
illustrate the limits of constitutional protections, and that 
international legal rights are needed more urgently than ever to fill 
the lacunae in domestic legal protections.  In this short introductory 
Article to the Symposium Issue, I offer no more than an overview 
of the issues raised during previous moments of legal crisis rather 
 
 1 See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s 
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-
trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/REB3-BKJ5]. 
 2 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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than an in-depth analysis of the merits of the arguments in the cases. 
I. Mobilizing in the Wake of the Civil Wars in Central 
America 
U.S. intervention in the Northern Triangle countries of Central 
America—Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—on 
behalf of huge corporate interests, particularly the food 
conglomerates, is by now a fairly well-understood historical fact.3  
However, the ongoing consequences of U.S. interventions, aimed at 
suppressing primarily indigenous and popular uprisings that 
challenged brutal and entrenched dictatorships, are rarely 
understood as directly linked to this historical past.4  Although 
direct U.S. government intervention in the politics of the region 
began in the 1950s with the U.S. overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz 
government in Guatemala, U.S. support for repressive regimes was 
arguably a main factor in exacerbating the civil conflicts across 
Central America in the 1980s and 1990s.5  Interventions by the 
United States and the civil wars that ensued caused a massive 
refugee outflow across the region; approximately 600,000 Central 
American refugees fled to the United States during those years, not 
counting those seeking refuge in other Central and South American 
states as well as Europe.6 
 
 3 See, e.g., JASON M. COLBY, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE 3–4, 11 (2011); RONALD W. 
COX, POWER AND PROFITS: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 58–59, 116–17, 133–34 
(1994). 
 4 See John H. Coastworth, United States Interventions, REVISTA (2005), 
https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/us-foreign-policy-spring-summer-2005 
[https://perma.cc/T2H4-ND5R]; CHRISTINA PERKINS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES  PROJECT ON PROSPERITY & DEV., ACHIEVING GROWTH AND SECURITY IN THE 
NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Dec. 2016) (describing historical roots and 
current violence and economic instability in Northern Triangle and how it relates to US 
intervention and migration). 
 5 See generally Coastworth, supra note 4 (describing United States interventions 
throughout Latin America, dismissing as implausible most claims of security reasons, and 
describing theories that economic interests, domestic politics, and “the global strategy 
effect” were the true reasons for interventions). 
 6 The author was fortunate enough to begin her legal work as a pro bono lawyer 
with the San Francisco Lawyers’ Committee at the time, then established and directed the 
Immigration Project at Public Counsel in Los Angeles. California hosted the vast majority 
of the refugees from Central America and was the center of significant mobilization of 
lawyers and a pro bono and clinical legal movement to provide representation to the 
individual refugees. At the same time, the joint public interest and private law partnership 
facilitated productive sharing of legal theories and evidence development that allowed 
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U.S. policy, despite the ratification of the Protocol on the Status 
of Refugees (Refugee Protocol), was to institutionalize a reading of 
the Protocol to deny the vast majority of Central American asylum 
cases.7  During the height of the refugee crisis, the grant rate of 
Salvadoran claims was about 2%, while for Guatemalans it was 
about .05%.8  Mass detention of Central American refugees 
followed, including harsh detention in large, newly-built centers 
near the border and in remote areas, such as at El Centro and 
Florence, Arizona.  Government strategies, besides the restrictive 
interpretations of U.S./international refugee law and mass 
detention, included preventing children from being sponsored by 
family members in the United States for release from detention; 
huge bonds that few could raise; locating detention centers far from 
towns and cities with attorneys, and restricting access to detention 
facilities in various ways.9 
 
challenges to biased adjudications to move forward through the courts. 
 7 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
extending it to cover all who have become refugees, irrespective of the date, and without 
geographic limitation). Until new asylum regulations were issued in 1990, all immigration 
judges were required to forward copies of every asylum and withholding application to the 
Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), which 
then issued an ‘opinion’ on the validity of the case. See JAMES SILK, U.S. COMM. FOR 
REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 29–30 
(1986). Empirical research on the relationship between the BHRHA opinions and 
immigration court decisions concluded that there was almost complete congruence 
between the two. Id. at 30. This factor ensured government bias in every asylum 
adjudication. See id.; see also Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee 
Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 253–54 (1984). 
 8 Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American 
Asylum Seekers, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 576 (2011) (noting that denial rates for asylum 
applications filed by Salvadorans was 97% and 99% for Guatemalans). Statistics for 1984 
reflected a grant rate of 2% for Salvadoran asylum claims; 49% for Polish claims; and 66% 
for Iranian claims. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-33BR, ASYLUM: 
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN—FEW DENIED OR DEPORTED 1 (1987). 
In 1989, the grant rates were 1.9% for Guatemalan claims, 2.3% for Salvadoran claims, 
3.5% for Haitian claims. In sharp contrast, during the same period, 81% of Soviet claims 
were granted, 65.8% of Ethiopian claims, and 90.9% of the Romanian claims were granted. 
The BHRHA advisory opinions heavily weighted the government’s Cold War bias in the 
grant rates for all claims for relief from deportation. See id. at 9–10; see also AMNESTY 
INT’L, REASONABLE FEAR: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY (1990). 
 9 See generally ROBERT S. KAHN, OTHER PEOPLE’S BLOOD: U.S. IMMIGRATION 
PRISONS IN THE REAGAN DECADE (1996) (examining illegal actions by the federal 
government in their treatment of refugees fleeing civil wars and death squads in Central 
America). 
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In response, private and public interest lawyer partnerships 
developed to provide pro bono legal representation in the face of 
insufficient legal resources for the hundreds of thousands of 
individuals who needed representation.  Impact litigation 
challenging some of the worst policies became more robust because 
of the private/public interest partnership.  Some of the most 
important decisions—both positive and negative—arose from this 
effort, such as the class action decisions of American Baptist 
Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC v. Thornburgh) on biased 
adjudications;10 Flores v. Meese, on the rights of child asylum-
seekers;11 and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca (INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca) on interpreting the standard of 
proof in asylum claims.12 
On the activism side, lawyers, activists, and church groups 
formed partnerships to institutionalize the sanctuary movement, 
providing safe havens in towns, cities, and churches to refuse to turn 
Central American refugees over to government officials for 
detention or deportation.13  Established organizations such as 
CARECEN and the Central American solidarity movement 
collaborated to spread information in schools, colleges, and 
universities, and spurred delegations from the United States to 
document first-hand the violence faced by refugees, and to set up 
sister cities between United States and Central American cities.14 
The international legal strategies within the domestic 
framework at the time included arguments interpreting U.S. 
obligations under the Refugee Protocol based on international 
humanitarian and human rights law, both in individual cases and in 
 
 10 American Baptist Church v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(approving class action settlement agreement to remedy mass denials of asylum 
applications by Guatemalans and Salvadorans by providing for de novo asylum interviews, 
stays of deportation, and work authorization). 
 11 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 17, 1997) (agreeing to general policy favoring release of minors and requiring that 
children who are detained are placed in the least restrictive setting possible). 
 12 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that the standard that 
applies to asylum claims is “well-founded fear of persecution”). 
 13 See Coutin, supra note 8 (describing the efforts of sanctuary activists); see also 
Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton & James Loucky, The Sanctuary Movement and 
Central American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 LATIN AM. PERSP. 101, 105–07, 117 (2009) 
(outlining the coalitions involved in the sanctuary movement). 
 14 Chinchilla, Hamilton & Loucky, supra note 13, at 116–18 (describing 
CARECEN’s efforts and the movement’s spread to universities). 
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the consolidated and class actions.15  These efforts continued into 
the Haitian refugee influx, which also precipitated strategies based 
on international law, both in individual cases and in class actions 
like the Haitian Centers Council litigation brought by Yale and the 
Miami advocates.16  In individual asylum and refugee cases, 
advocates made international human rights and international 
humanitarian law arguments challenging the interpretation of the 
grounds of asylum, as well as a range of other practices.   
Inevitably, there was backlash: attacks on CARECEN and 
CISPES and the broader Central American solidarity movement that 
included, for example, breaks-ins and raids on the casefiles of the 
Harvard legal clinic, arrests of prominent activists for public 
dissent, and various types of threats to solidarity organizations.17   
Despite the orchestrated backlash that included targeting by 
government entities, both statewide and nationwide challenges 
slowed the mass deportation efforts and resulted in the passing of 
extended voluntary departure, temporary protection status, and 
finally, the Legalization Program of IRCA and NACARA—
providing permanent protection to thousands of Central Americans 
 
 15 See In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985), 
aff’d on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 1988). See also In re 
Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 21, 1987); In re 
Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 18, 1988); In 
re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564 781, A29 564 785 
and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Ct., Washington, D.C., Aug. 24, 1990) (all cited and discussed 
in Jennifer Moore, Simple Justice: Humanitarian Law as a Defense to Deportation, 4 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 11, 12, 26 (1991)). 
 16 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that the President 
is not prohibited by the INA or the Refugee Protocol from ordering the Coast Guard to 
intercept people traveling at sea from Haiti to the United States and return them to Haiti 
without considering whether they qualify as refugees); Harold Hongju Koh & Michael J. 
Wishnie, The Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: Guantanamo and Refoulement, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 385–432 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009) 
(explaining the strategies used in Sale and its impact). 
 17 See Coutin, supra note 8, at 578 (describing prosecutions of activists); Chinchilla, 
Hamilton & Loucky, supra note 13, at 107, 109, 117 (describing arrests of Sanctuary 
movement activists, warnings to churches to stop offering sanctuary to refugees, and INS 
efforts to cut off federal funds to Los Angeles when considered becoming a sanctuary city). 
On FBI involvement in raids on activists, legal clinics and others to suppress Central 
American activism, see ROSS GELBSPAN, BREAK-INS, DEATH THREATS AND THE FBI: THE 
COVERT WAR AGAINST THE CENTRAL AMERICA MOVEMENT 1–3 (1991); see also CHIP 
BERLET, THE HUNT FOR RED MENACE: HOW GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES & 
PRIVATE RIGHT-WING GROUPS TARGET DISSIDENTS & LEFTISTS AS SUBVERSIVE 
TERRORISTS & OUTLAWS 4, 62 (1994). 
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in the United States and allowing their families to join them and 
become residents.18 
II. Defending the ‘Secret Evidence’ Cases of the 1990s 
Although not the first laws and policies to single out Arab non-
citizens as specific targets of law enforcement, in the 1990s the 
George H. W. Bush (Bush I) administration began a law 
enforcement surveillance and interrogation program that included 
fingerprinting all U.S. residents and immigrants of only Arab origin.  
The Clinton Administration passed two laws that included measures 
with harsh provisions that were almost exclusively enforced against 
Arab refugees and immigrants in the United States, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) of 1996.19  One cluster of cases during this period, 
however, was paradigmatic of the government’s selective 
enforcement of immigration laws against Arabs and Muslims, 
widely known as the ‘secret evidence’ cases.  The government’s 
strategies in these cases were to use ‘anti-terrorism’ immigration 
regulations under IIRIRA and AEDPA to deport, exclude, and 
detain Arabs on the basis of evidence that it refused to disclose to 
the individuals, their families, or their representatives.  IIRIRA 
authorized the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings, 
and AEDPA established an Alien Terrorist Removal Court with 
specific proceedings to try ‘alien terrorists.’20  In the secret evidence 
cases, however, the government sidestepped the restrictions built 
into the new proceedings and courts for trying aliens charged on 
terrorism-related grounds, and relied on garden-variety immigration 
regulations to claim its evidence was classified and non-disclosure 
was warranted under the new laws.21 
 
 18 See Coutin, supra note 8, at 580–81, 583–85 (explaining how pressure on the INS 
led to legal reform). 
 19 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). For a good review of the effects of 
AEDPA and IIRIRA on Arabs in the United States, see Michael J. Whidden, Unequal 
Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2825 (2001). 
 20 AEDPA § 303(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2001); AEDPA § 401(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1533 
(2003). See  IIRIRA § 304 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000)). 
 21 A number of the individuals who were charged and detained on secret evidence 
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The test case for using immigration regulations to ground the 
government’s actions in the secret evidence cases was the 17-year 
litigation known as the ‘LA-8.’  The eight LA-8 individuals who 
were arrested, detained, and placed in deportation proceedings were 
rounded up on the basis of their association with the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which the government 
charged as an organization that advocated ‘doctrines of world 
communism.’22  The individuals were seven Palestinians and the 
Kenyan wife of one of them—all of whom were students and others 
active in the Los Angeles-area on Palestinian rights.  The group had 
been the subject of FBI surveillance for over three years, and when 
the FBI found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, it turned the 
case to Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), 
recommending deportation.  The government refused to produce its 
evidence in open court, which, when the courts struck down the use 
of secret evidence after almost two decades of litigation, turned out 
to be nothing more than entirely legal activity protected by the First 
Amendment.23  During the course of the LA-8 litigation, the lawyers 
defending them were also subjected to FBI surveillance, which they 
discovered and challenged in separate proceedings in federal 
court.24 
While the LA-8 litigation wound its way through the courts—in 
the end, all the way to the Supreme Court on a claim of selective 
immigration enforcement—the government continued using its 
 
were held for long periods of time, several for three and four years. For a sample of the 
decisions, see Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 
71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Nasser Ahmed, (N.Y., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. May 1, 
1996); Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 588 (E.D. Va. 1999); Haddam v. Holder, 547 F. 
App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2013). The author was co-counsel with Malea Kiblan and Rene 
Kathawala in the over 20-year litigation of Anwar Haddam, which ended in a grant of 
withholding, but the government continues to attempt to remove Dr. Haddam to Algeria 
as of the date of this writing, despite the death sentences against him by both the Algerian 
government and the terrorist organization, the Islamic Armed Group (GIA). 
 22 United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 23 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Am.-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other 
grounds, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
 24 See ACLU v. Thornburgh, Civ. Action No. 89-2248 (D.D.C. June 26, 1989), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. ACLU Foundation of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991). 
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secret evidence strategies from that case in about two dozen other 
cases.  Working together, the INS and the FBI used the immigration 
regulations and the claim of terrorism to refuse to disclose evidence, 
and proceeded to detain and place in deportation proceedings Arab 
and Muslim immigrants without providing the basis for charges 
against them.  In most of these cases, the litigation focused on 
statutory and constitutional due process rights, but in some of the 
cases involving asylum claims, the petitioners’ arguments involved 
the inconsistency between the application of asylum grounds and 
terrorism bars under US and international law.25 
III. Mobilizing post-September 11, 2001 for Guantanamo 
Detainees 
Turning to the third period of relevance, September 11, 2001, it 
is often described as an event when ‘everything changed’ in the 
United States and the “gloves came off” as Bush administration 
officials liked to say.26  That stark before/after characterization 
stands to be disputed, as many of the policies that were put in place 
immediately after 9/11 had been tested by various government 
entities prior to 9/11.  Nevertheless, much like the post-Trump 
period, policies previously considered to have dubious legality 
became normalized.27 
Such policies included detentions without trial, using the label 
of administrative detention for criminal-related charges (such as 
terrorism-related immigration charges); the use of secret evidence 
to arrest, detain, and deport immigrants and other non-citizens;28 the 
 
 25 For a complete list of these cases and the laws and regulations under which charges 
were brought against the individuals involved, see Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets 
Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999). 
 26 Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1, 22 (2009); William C. Banks, 9/11 Symposium: Five Years On: A Look at the 
Global Response to Terrorism: The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1240 (2007). 
 27 See generally Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and 
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the 
United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609 
(2005) (detailing post-9/11 policies and their constitutional implications); Sonia R. Farber, 
Forgotten at Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision and Its Implications for Refugees at 
the Base under the Obama Administration, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 989 (2010) (discussing the 
treatment of detainees over time, including decisions in Hamdan, Rasul, and Boumediene, 
and focusing on refugees still detained there). 
 28 See Martin Schwartz, Niels Frenzen & Mayra L. Calo, Recent Developments on 
the INS’s Use of Secret Evidence Against Aliens, in 2001-02 IMMIGRATION & 
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targeting of Arabs and Muslims for ‘special measures’ that were 
extralegal or clearly unconstitutional, but mostly upheld by the 
courts;29 and mass roundups and mass deportations through 
immigration detention without due process.30  In the hysteria that 
surrounded these measures, both lawyer and activist mobilization 
was difficult and slow, primarily because of the widespread 
publicity that all Arabs and Muslims were terrorists because the 
9/11 hijackers were Muslim and Arab.31  Legal representation of 
individuals held in administrative detention was extremely difficult 
because of the incommunicado administrative detention under 
which most were held.32  Lawyers, when they could locate clients, 
were routinely prevented access, and individuals were denied the 
right to call lawyers or their consulates for assistance.33 
 
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK 300 (2001). 
 29 Supreme Court Allows Secrecy to Stand in Deportation Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2002, at A10. 
 30 Jim Edwards, Data Show Shoddy Due Process for Post-Sept. 11 Immigration 
Detainees, N.J. L.J. 1 (Feb. 4, 2002); William Glaberson, Closed Immigration Hearings 
Criticized as Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B7. 
 31 See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched 
Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 33–34, 37–39 (2009) 
(describing how stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs as terrorists became entrenched 
following 9/11). See also AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1991 REPORT 
ON ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES (1992); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 
1995 REPORT ON ANTI-ARAB RACISM (1995); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
COMM., 1996-1997 REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-
AMERICANS (1997); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1998-2000 REPORT 
ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS (2001); Dan Eggen & 
Cheryl W. Thompson, US Seeks Thousands Ordered Deported: Middle Eastern Men are 
Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1; Dan Eggen, Deportee Sweep Will Start 




 32 See Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (July 21, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/21/illusion-
justice/human-rights-abuses-us-terrorism-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/F6CJ-JQT3]. 
 33 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 130–37 (2003), 
available at https://oig.justice.gov/special/0306/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS64-R6JP]; 
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE IN METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER 
IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 1, 32–33 (2003), available at 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0312/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6LC-VPGE]; AMNESTY 
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Meanwhile, Guantanamo became a paradigm of its own.  As the 
United States began transferring individuals to Guantanamo, first 
from Afghanistan, then from all over the world, the Administration 
announced that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to persons 
captured in the war on terror.34  The Office of Legal Counsel issued 
a memorandum claiming that no court would have jurisdiction to 
hear challenges concerning the detention of anyone held at 
Guantanamo.35  One of the main goals of the Bush Administration 
in its massive detention strategy was to prevent independent court 
review as well as to severely curtail detainees’ access to counsel, in 
order to ensure unfettered use of whatever interrogation techniques 
it chose to implement.  For example, the United States labeled the 
Guantanamo prisoners ‘enemy combatants,’36 a term that is found 
nowhere in the Geneva Conventions.  Other terms the United States 
suggested included ‘underprivileged enemy combatants,’37 
‘security internees,’38 ‘criminal detainees,’39 ‘persons under U.S. 
 
INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS REGARDING 
POST SEPTEMBER 11 DETENTIONS IN THE USA 6–7, 17–18, 20–21 (2002); DOJ Orders 
Incentives, ‘Voluntary’ Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1816, 1817 (2001); Josh Meyer, Dragnet Produces Few Terrorist Ties, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1. 
 34 See Pentagon: Geneva Convention Doesn’t Cover Detainees, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 
2002), http://www.crimelynx.com/nogen.html [https://perma.cc/MQV6-YPVL]; see also 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, A POLICY TO EVADE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/2.htm#_ftn4 [https://perma.cc/NKJ4-E9MX]. 
 35 See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 
2001), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzales-
aug1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH6A-S96X]. 
 36 See, e.g., Andrew Morgan, Guantanamo Bay: Military Commissions and Enemy 
Combatants, JURIST (July 20, 2013), https://www.jurist.org/archives/feature/guantanamo-
bay-military-commissions-and-enemy-combatants/ [https://perma.cc/S6HX-B9HK]. 
 37 See DEPT. OF ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT ON DETAINEE OPERATIONS 45–
47 (July 21, 2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT], 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/daig_detainee-
ops_21jul2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFK9-8DNJ]. 
 38 See Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 8 (2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE 
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 1018 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 
2005). 
 39 Id. 
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forces control,’40 and ‘low-level enemy combatants.’41  These terms 
are unrelated to any of the recognized international legal categories: 
prisoners of war;42 civilian internees;43 or non-privileged 
belligerents.44  By avoiding the international-consensus application 
of the Geneva Conventions, the United States managed to avoid 
providing the Guantanamo detainees the fundamental protections 
entitled to persons in any of the recognized categories: military trials 
with fundamental due process for combatants accused of war crimes 
or release at termination of hostilities; civilian trials with full due 
process for non-combatants charged with crimes and immediate 
release for those found  not to be a threat to the security of the United 
States; and, critically, protections against torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading, treatment or punishment.45  To that end, the United 
States maintained that the only rules applying to the prisoners on 
Guantanamo were those in the 13 November 2001 Military Order 
on the Detention, Treatment and Trial in the War Against Terrorism, 
which allowed detainees to be detained indefinitely without charge 
or trial, or to be tried before a military commission.46  The Order did 
not permit any of the detainees’ access to the civilian courts within 
the United States, or to any other type of relief.47 
Most troubling, as the comprehensive study conducted by Seton 
 
 40 DAIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 45–47. 
 41 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 513 (2004) (“enemy combatant”); Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 431 (2004) (“enemy combatant”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 570 (2006) (“enemy combatant” and “underprivileged belligerent”); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (“enemy combatant”). 
 42 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 43 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War arts. 79–96, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 44 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
42, art. 5. 
 45 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
42, arts. 5, 17, 84, 118; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, supra note 43, arts. 3, 71, 118, 132–33. For gaps between the U.S. 
constitutional framework and fundamental international law protections highlighted in the 
Guantanamo cases, see Susan M. Akram, Do Constitutions Make a Difference as regards 
the Protection of fundamental Human Rights? Comparing the United States and Israel, in 
THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Frishman & 
Muller eds., 2010). 
 46 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  
 47 Id. at § 7. 
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Hall in 2006 illustrated, the vast majority of the detainees picked up 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere and transferred to Guantanamo had 
no involvement in hostilities against the United States.48  This is 
reflected in the cases: only ten of the approximately 800 detainees 
held at Guantanamo since 2001 were charged with crimes, while the 
rest were denied the right to civilian trials and either held without 
charge or ultimately transferred to other countries for trial or further 
detention.  Most were transferred or released to other countries by 
2009.  As of the date of this writing, 40 detainees remain on 
Guantanamo.49 
In the first year or so after September 11, the burden fell on 
organizations such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
National Lawyers Guild, and the American Civil Liberties Union to 
represent both individuals held in the United States and on 
Guantanamo arrested in the ‘war on terror,’ until private law firms 
started to understand the stakes involved in the cases and issues.  
Much like in the earlier secret evidence cases, one of the main 
challenges to defending both individuals rounded up in the post-
9/11 Arab and Muslim detention and deportation cases and in the 
Guantanamo cases was the extreme secrecy and prevention of 
access lawyers faced in identifying and communicating with the 
clients. 
In addition to attempting to use substantive international law 
arguments in the litigation, defense lawyers also tried to use 
international human rights mechanisms to implement the Supreme 
Court decisions that international law did apply to the detainees.  
These included attempts to seek access to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to conduct refugee status 
determinations at Guantanamo; to address the United Nations 
special mechanisms to request access to Guantanamo, conduct 
 
 48 See generally MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, THE GUANTANAMO 
DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY (2006) (55% of the detainees committed no 
hostile acts against the United States; only 5 % were seized on the battlefield; 86% were 
turned over to U.S. custody by Pakistani or Afghan individuals for a $5,000 bounty per 
head; out of the over 700 people who have been at Guantanamo, only 10 have been charged 
with crimes). 
 49 See Facts about the Transfer of Guantanamo Detainees, HUM. RTS. FIRST, 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers 
[https://perma.cc/8M4D-SDCT]; see also Guantanamo by the Numbers, AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/detention/guantanamo-numbers 
[https://perma.cc/UJZ4-QB9D]. 
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investigations and issue their own reports; and other efforts at the 
Human Rights Council and the treaty bodies—particularly the 
Committees for the Conventions on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) and on Civil and Political Rights (HRC).  
These efforts resulted in a flurry of outstanding United Nations 
Special Rapporteur reports, concluding observations and other 
interventions by the human rights mechanisms, but had basically no 
effect on U.S. policy or actions.50  Ultimately, the lawyers never 
succeeded in getting UNHCR access to Guantanamo, or any traction 
on conducting refugee status determinations in cases where 
resettlement might have been an option. Although post-2004, there 
was growing legal mobilization for the Guantanamo detainees, there 
have been few victories and many long-lasting defeats. 
IV. The Questionable Success of International Legal Strategies 
This section explores generally the use of international legal 
strategies in the relevant periods to answer the question: how did 
the international legal strategies attempted by U.S. lawyers fare in 





 50 See, e.g., Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the 
Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 48–53, 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (Jan. 26, 
2010); Leila Zerrougui, Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, & Paul Hunt, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Situation of 
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006); see also 
Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture at the Expert Meeting on 
the Situation of Detainees Held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (Oct. 3, 2013), 
available at 
https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13859
&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/6G2U-3JMC] (noting that the 2006 joint report “contains 
many conclusions and recommendations that are regrettably still relevant due to a lack of 
implementation by the government”). 
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A. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in 
Refugee Claims in the 1980’s and 1990s. 
In re Medina, brought before the Immigration Court in 
Harlingen, Texas, was the first case based on a claim that 
deportation of an asylum-seeker to El Salvador, a country embroiled 
in violent civil conflict, violated U.S. obligations under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and Article 33 of the Refugee Protocol.  The 
applicant, Jesus del Carmen Medina, sought asylum and 
withholding of deportation (withholding of removal under current 
law) on the grounds that since El Salvador was in violation of 
Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), and the United 
States was a party to the treaty, the United States was required under 
its Article 1 not to return her there.51  She argued that both under 
GCIV and under customary international law, since El Salvador was 
in gross violation of humanitarian law rules which the United States 
was bound to respect, it must, at a minimum, withhold her 
deportation to the place engaging in such gross violations of 
humanitarian law.  The immigration judge, surprisingly, agreed that 
GCIV applied, that Article 3 governed the obligations of El 
Salvador in the non-international armed conflict there, and that the 
United States, also a State Party, was required to provide relief in 
deportation proceedings under its Article 1 obligations.  The judge 
also found that GCIV was self-executing, and that he had the 
authority to apply GCIV on deportability.  However, he denied her 
request for asylum and withholding on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence of violations of international humanitarian law 
occurring in El Salvador.  On appeal, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding, but 
on the basis that the Fourth Geneva Convention was not self-
executing, and there was no corollary customary law protection for 
 
        51 In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985), aff’d 
on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. 734 (BIA 1988). Medina testified that 
many Salvadoran civilians were afraid of getting caught up in the violent military conflict 
between government and insurgent forces in El Salvador and were subjected to brutal 
treatment or killed. Id. at 4. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, supra note 42, art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to 
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum … (1) Persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities … shall be in all circumstances treated humanely”); see id. at art. 1 (“The 
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances.”). 
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relief other than what was codified in the INA.  It also held that an 
immigration judge has no authority to consider any relief not 
explicitly authorized within the immigration statute and 
regulations.52 
Following the first Medina decision, lawyers around the country 
began developing arguments for asylum and withholding based on 
claims that Central American refugees were fleeing flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law.53  After the Medina 
decision, the San Francisco immigration court decided two claims 
for asylum and withholding under similar arguments raised in the 
Medina case—that this relief was equivalent to a binding 
humanitarian law norm of ‘temporary refuge.’  In the cases In re 
Madrid-Norio and In re Aguilar-Moreno, the immigration court 
agreed that despite rampant violations of humanitarian law in El 
Salvador, the United States had no obligations under either GCIV 
or customary international law to grant relief from deportation to 
persons fleeing the civil war there.54  In contrast, in In re Santos-
Gomez, Washington D.C. Immigration Court Judge Nejelski 
granted the applicants relief on the temporary refuge argument on 
the basis that returning them to civil war would violate a customary 
international law obligation binding the  United States not to return 
someone to risk of “murder, rape and destruction.”  Despite the 
BIA’s ruling in Medina denying claims for relief under 
humanitarian law, the judge in Santos-Gomez explicitly found that 
U.S. immigration judges had jurisdiction to consider customary 
international law claims, and indeed, had an obligation to do so. 
The Santos-Gomez decision gained no traction, however, as 
humanitarian law arguments in support of claims for asylum, 
 
 52 See In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985), 
aff’d on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. 734 (BIA 1988). Matter of 
Medina, Interim Decision 3078 (BIA 1988) available at 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,USA_BIA,3ae6b6b14.html [https://perma.cc/S8HX-
GM5N ]. The author is indebted to the work of Jennifer Moore whose excellent analysis 
informs this discussion. See Moore, supra note 15. 
 53 These arguments were developed in large part due to the work of Karen Parker, 
whose expertise was invaluable for lawyers around the country in making their claims for 
temporary refuge. See Karen Parker, Geneva Convention Protections for Salvadoran 
Refugees: An International Law Defense Against Deportation and a Justification for 
Sanctuary, 13 IMMIGR. NEWSL. 7 (1984). 
 54 In re Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 21, 
1987); In re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 18, 
1988) (cited by Moore, supra note 15). 
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temporary refuge, and protection for refugees were firmly rejected 
by the federal courts.55  In Echeverria-Hernandez, the petitioner 
sought relief from deportation on the temporary refuge argument 
under customary international law, rather than the treaty argument 
based on GCIV.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument that temporary refuge for persons fleeing civil war had 
ripened into a customary law rule, as the petitioner had not proved 
that countries applying such a norm did so on the basis of opinio 
juris.56  Critically, the Court ruled that the 1980 Refugee Act was 
the complete codification of U.S. law on admission of refugees, and 
any other international law norm was, therefore, precluded.57 
In several cases that arose from civil society activism related to 
the civil wars, respondents/petitioners relied on international legal 
arguments to advance their claims.  In the nationwide class action 
litigation American Baptist Churches v. Meese (ABC v. Meese), the 
petitioners claimed that prosecutions of sanctuary organizations and 
individuals involved in the sanctuary movement to prevent 
deportation of Central American refugees violated GCIV 
obligations and the customary norm of temporary refuge.58  The 
District Court ruled that there was no binding norm of temporary 
refuge under international law that protected persons fleeing armed 
conflict; moreover, the 1980 Refugee Act precluded such claims.59   
The ABC case ended in a settlement that terminated the 
deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan class members pending 
adjudication or re-adjudication of their asylum claims, and required 
that they be released from immigration detention, among other 
stipulations.  However, the settlement was reached on the strength 
of the Court’s findings that Central American asylum claims were 
routinely decided on discriminatory and ideologically-biased 
grounds that violated the United States’ immigration laws and not 
on any international law ground.60  The Ninth Circuit reached 
 
 55 See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989); American 
Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770–71 (N.D. Cal. 1989); 
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 693–94 (9th Cir. 1991); Bradvica v. INS, 128 
F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 56 See Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d at 693. 
 57 See id. at 694. 
 58 ABC v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. at 756. 
 59 See id. at 771. 
 60 Id. at 756. 
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similar conclusions in U.S. v. Aguilar and affirmed the criminal 
convictions of activists involved in the sanctuary movement under 
the ‘harboring of aliens’ statute.61  The Aguilar defendants appealed 
their convictions on grounds that their actions in defense of Central 
American refugees were protected under the Refugee Protocol as 
well as international norms governing the rights of individuals to 
refuge from civil war.  The Ninth Circuit rejected both the 
customary international and treaty-based arguments—finding that 
even though the United States was a party to the Refugee Protocol, 
the treaty was not self-executing.  Thus, the United States had no 
international legal obligations towards refugees other than to the 
extent of the Refugee Protocol’s incorporation into the INA.62 
The Supreme Court weighed in on several key arguments for 
refugees and asylum-seekers during this period.  In three main 
cases, INS v. Stevic, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, the Supreme Court addressed claims on behalf of 
refugees and asylum-seekers seeking to interpret United States 
immigration law and its codification of the Refugee Protocol in a 
manner consistent with international standards.  In INS v. Stevic, the 
Supreme Court was asked to interpret the obligation of non-
refoulement and the scope of Articles 33 and Article 1(A)(2) under 
the Refugee Protocol.63  The respondent claimed that United States 
codification of these provisions in the INA as withholding of 
deportation and asylum had to be interpreted consistently with the 
international consensus on the scope of Articles 33 and 1(A)(2).64  
He claimed these provisions had a generous meaning under 
international law—relying on the UNHCR Handbook and other 
 
 61 See United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1436. 
 62 Id. at 1454. 
 63 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). 
 64 Withholding of deportation has been amended several times and is now termed 
withholding of removal. The version at issue in the Stevic case prohibited deportation of 
an alien ‘to a country [where his/her] life or freedom would be threatened . . . on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ 
See I.N.A. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). Political asylum is governed by I.N.A. § 
208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), which authorizes the Attorney General to grant asylum to any 
alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his country because of ‘persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.’ For reasons peculiar to his case and governing 
law, Stevic was not eligible to apply for asylum, but was seeking an interpretation of the 
relief of withholding that was the equivalent of the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for 
asylum. 
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evidence of international consensus and state practice—and that all 
persons who qualify as a ‘refugee’ were entitled to non-refoulement, 
the core obligation of all States Parties under the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
international law arguments, finding that the scope of United States 
obligations under the Protocol were only as incorporated in the INA, 
and that not all refugees are entitled to non-refoulement under 
United States law.  The Court found that the clear difference in 
language between the two statutory provisions meant that to be 
eligible for withholding of deportation an alien had to prove his/her 
life or freedom would be threatened—a ‘clear probability of 
persecution’ standard, while for asylum, s/he had to meet a lesser 
standard of ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’65 
Three years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question left 
open by Stevic, which was: what exactly is required to prove the 
‘well-founded fear of persecution’ standard for asylum?  In INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the respondent claimed that the well-founded 
fear standard was different and required a far lower standard of 
proof than withholding, and that based on her claim, she was 
entitled to asylum.66  The Court agreed with the respondent.  In what 
seemed like a deeper review of international law, the Court referred 
to the UNHCR Handbook and international and comparative legal 
experts to interpret the meaning of the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol.  Although the outcome was favorable for the respondent, 
the Court’s analysis and international legal interpretive 
methodology remained deeply flawed, and moved U.S. refugee 
jurisprudence farther away from international practice, as discussed 
further below. 
The third case in this Supreme Court trilogy concerned Haitian 
refugees and continued the flawed interpretation of the prior two 
cases on international law in the protection of asylum-seekers.  In 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, refugees fleeing the repressive 
policies of the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti challenged the routine 
interception of their boats by U.S. coast guard cutters on the high 
seas and the summary return of refugees to Haiti.67  The question 
before the Supreme Court was whether the non-refoulement 
provision in Refugee Protocol Article 33(1) prohibited the United 
 
 65 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425, 430. 
 66 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 67 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
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States from interdicting refugees on the high seas and returning 
them to a country from which they feared persecution; in other 
words, whether the non-refoulement obligation has extraterritorial 
application.  The Supreme Court ruled that neither Article 33 of the 
Refugee Protocol nor the INA precluded the United States from 
intercepting refugees in international waters and returning them, 
even to a risk of persecution.  The Court’s analysis relied on a 
limited review of the travaux preparatoires of the Refugee 
Convention, but its reading, and ultimate interpretation of the 
provision at issue, was the opposite of the interpretation provided 
by the UNHCR and other international authorities in their amicus 
briefs in the case.68 
B. International Human Rights Law in the Secret Evidence 
Cases of the 1990s 
There were few international legal arguments raised in the two 
dozen secret evidence cases litigated in immigration proceedings in 
the aftermath of the passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA, and none on 
the challenge to the use of secret evidence.  Reviewing just a few of 
the cases illustrates the reasons that international legal arguments 
were rarely raised to litigate the claims, and when such arguments 
were raised, why they received no traction in the courts. 
The two respondents who were detained for the longest period 
of time on secret evidence were Mazen al-Najjar and Anwar 
Haddam—held for four-and-a-half years and close to four years 
respectively.  Al-Najjar’s counsel did not rely on international law, 
but Anwar Haddam’s did at various stages of the two decades of 
litigating his case.  Mazen al-Najjar was a Palestinian refugee from 
Gaza who had lived in the United States for 18 years prior to his 
arrest in 1997.  He had entered initially as a student, obtained 
Masters and Doctorate degrees, married and had three U.S. citizen 
children with whom he was residing in Tampa.  He worked in a 
think tank at the University of South Florida, the World and Islam 
Studies Enterprise (WISE), and was the editor-in-chief of its 
journal.69  In a pattern eerily similar to the LA-8 case, the FBI 
 
 68 Id. at 190–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brief of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, McNary 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (No. 92-344). 
 69 See Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000). See Akram, supra 
note 25, at 71–77. 
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targeted the Muslim community in Tampa for surveillance for four 
years for evidence of connections to ‘terrorist groups’ in the Middle 
East.  When no such evidence was found, the investigation was 
terminated, but several individuals were turned over to INS for 
deportation proceedings, including al-Najjar and his brother-in-law, 
Sami al-Arian.70  In immigration proceedings on deportability for 
visa overstay, al-Najjar and his wife were denied asylum.  A few 
days after the decision, FBI and INS agents arrested al-Najjar based 
on classified information of connections with Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, and he was held without bond for posing a 
threat to national security.71  Three and a half years in detention 
later, al-Najjar was released without being given information about 
the charges or evidence against him.  A few months later, he was re-
arrested and deported to an undisclosed country in 2002.72 
Al-Najjar’s case, like many of the secret evidence cases of this 
period, was based on evidence he was never able to challenge, and 
which ultimately proved to be grounded solely on association with 
alleged terrorists, on the basis of evidence provided by untested and 
unreliable ex parte witnesses.73  Al-Najjar’s challenge to the use of 
secret evidence to deny bond was ultimately successful on due 
process grounds, but not until two years into his detention, in habeas 
proceedings in federal district court.  Despite the finding by the 
district court that using classified information against al-Najjar was 
a violation of due process, and that ‘mere association’ with alleged 
terrorist organizations was insufficient to find him a threat to 
national security, the court did not order his release.74 
Anwar Haddam’s case also reflects the insufficiencies of 
constitutional and statutory-based arguments in challenging the use 
of secret evidence.  Anwar Haddam was an Algerian politician 
elected to Parliament in the first free elections in Algeria in its 
history, which brought his party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 
 
 70 For an exposé of the FBI investigation into WISE and background into the Tampa 
and other Arab and Muslim secret evidence cases, see John F. Sugg, Secret Evidence, 32 
THE LINK 1 (1999), available at http://ameu.org/getattachment/fd3114f0-2b78-466e-bf36-
b7a65d7b266c/Secret-Evidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/D6H5-5BJM]. 
 71 Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1333–34. 
 72 See Rachel La Corte, Deported Ex-Academic Reunited with Family, MIAMI 
HERALD, Feb. 6, 2003, at B3. 
 73 See Sugg, supra note 70 (describing the connections between Israeli consular 
officials and the investigation and targeting of the staff of WISE). 
 74 See Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57, 1361–62. 
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to power in 1991.  When the military staged a coup and overthrew 
the civilian government, the FIS President, and other elected 
members of Parliament were rounded up, detained, killed, or placed 
under house arrest.  FIS supporters were also rounded up by the 
thousands, arrested, interned in concentration camps where they 
were tortured and killed, launching a brutal civil war that lasted until 
2002.  Haddam was able to flee the country, and entered the United 
States in 1992, with his wife and three children, two of whom were 
United States citizens, and applied for asylum.  In December, 1996, 
he was detained, placed in removal (then-exclusion) proceedings, 
and charged with being a ‘persecutor of others’ on undisclosed 
evidence.75  In the litigation over his asylum claim, the persecutor 
of others bar and his detention, his attorneys challenged the use of 
secret evidence on due process and constitutional grounds.76  The 
BIA, in two decisions, ultimately reviewed the secret evidence and 
found it unpersuasive to support a claim that Dr. Haddam was a 
persecutor of others because the evidence was insufficient to show 
that he had ‘ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in 
the persecution of any person.’  The BIA found that the 
government’s interpretation of the persecutor of others ground was 
based solely on his speech, association or silence, and was an 
impermissible interpretation.77 
Throughout the case, Haddam’s attorneys challenged the 
interpretation of the persecutor of others bar on statutory, 
 
 75 During his four years of detention, Dr. Haddam had three immigration court 
proceedings, two appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals, in which he was granted 
asylum, two habeas corpus actions to seek his release, an extraordinary intervention by 
Attorney General Ashcroft who overturned his grant of asylum. Following his release, his 
case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit and then remanded for further immigration 
proceedings, ultimately resulting in the denial of asylum but a grant of withholding of 
removal over 20 years after the case began. 
       76 The INA includes several bars to a grant of asylum, including the “persecutor of 
others” bar, which was at issue in the Haddam case. The bar prohibits the grant of 
asylum to an individual who ‘ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.’ Other bars include: (1) conviction of a 
“particularly serious crime” such that the applicant is a danger to the United Sates, (2) 
committing a “serious non political crime” outside the United States, (3) posing a danger 
to the Security of the United States, or (4) being resettled in another country before 
arriving in the United States. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., Asylum Bars, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-bars 
[https://perma.cc/JC7K-2S7E]. 
       77 Matter of A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 777–78 (A.G. 2005) (citing Matter of A-H- 
(BIA 2000)).  
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constitutional and international law grounds.  At the BIA and in the 
Fourth Circuit, counsel argued that the persecutor of others bar 
under the INA was based on the Refugee Protocol and therefore 
must be interpreted consistently with its equivalent, the Protocol’s 
Article 1(F).78  This provision has developed into customary 
international law practice, as discussed in the authoritative review 
found in UNHCR guidance.79  Counsel cited a range of international 
cases on the interpretation of the equivalent of the United States 
persecutor of others ground in Article 1(F) to show that three main 
elements must be met for an individual to be barred from asylum on 
this ground, none of which were met in the Haddam case.80  The 
BIA assessed and reviewed the international law argument and 
cases cited by Haddam’s counsel and found that United States law 
was consistent with the international law norms underlying Article 
1(F).  Ultimately, although the Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
interpretation of the persecutor of others ground—and found for 
Haddam on this basis—its decision was based squarely on domestic, 
primarily Fourth Circuit, law and not international law.81  
Unfortunately, the Circuit Court affirmed the decision to deny 
Haddam asylum in the immigration judge’s discretion. Haddam’s 
challenges to the use of secret evidence were not successful, 
illustrating that neither due process nor the First Amendment were 
sufficient constitutional grounds to overcome the broad discretion 
given the government in immigration proceedings. 
Although some of the cases resulted in the courts disallowing 
the government’s reliance on secret evidence or requiring release of 
the evidence—including after in camera review revealed it was 
erroneously classified in the first place—none of the courts struck 
 
       78 Id. at 783–86; Haddam v. Holder, No. 547 F. App’x 306, 309–13 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 79 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Application 
of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Annex C (2003), available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/unhcr-
background-note-on-the-application-of-the-exclusion-clauses-article-1f-of-the-1951-
convention-relating-to-the-status-of-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/5JXC-3QV4]. 
 80 Under international jurisprudence, the elements which must be met to be barred as 
a persecutor under Article 1(F) are that the individual must: (1) be a member of an 
organization which has committed international offences as a continuous and regular part 
of its operation; (2) have personal and knowing participation in the offences; and (3) have 
failed to dissociate himself from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity. See 
Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173 (Fed. 
Ct. App. Can. 1992). 
 81 See Haddam v. Holder, 547 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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down the underlying legal provisions on which the government 
rested its claim of secrecy as facially unconstitutional.  Moreover, 
legislation to repeal the use of secret evidence in immigration 
proceedings has so far been unsuccessful, while its use has 
expanded post 9/11, under the USA PATRIOT Act and under 
various other provisions used in the Guantanamo cases.82 
C. International Human Rights Protections in Guantanamo 
Detainee Cases Post-9/11 
The three major cases that came before the United States 
Supreme Court concerning Guantanamo detainees started in June 
2004, and are particularly relevant to the efforts at incorporating 
international human rights and humanitarian law arguments to 
establish rights for the detainees.  The first was Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.83  Hamdi, an American citizen, was seized in Afghanistan 
and detained by American military as an ‘enemy combatant.’  The 
Court decided not only the constitutional question of lawful 
detention but also the application of international humanitarian law 
to enemy combatant classification.84  In the second case, Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on 
jurisdictional grounds, not reaching the substantive question of 
whether a U.S. citizen could be held without due process by the 
executive as an ‘enemy combatant.’85 
The third and most important case on whether international 
human rights law applied to the detainees was Rasul v. Bush, 
 
 82 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, § 412, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (Supp. I 2001). See Stephen Townley, The Use 
and Misuse of Secret Evidence in Immigration Cases: A Comparative Study of the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom, 32 YALE J. INT’L. L. 219 (2007). 
 83 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that the Executive 
Branch may constitutionally detain “enemy combatants”). 
 84 The Court’s decision was a mixed bag; on the one hand, the plurality (O’Connor, 
CJ Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer) found that Hamdi’s detention was lawful and that the 
Constitution permits executive detention, without triggering criminal process, of enemy 
combatants. On the other hand, the Court went on to hold that the military’s proceedings 
were deficient, and that certain minimum due process requirements had to be met, such as 
notice of the factual basis for Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant, and fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. 
 85 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (holding habeas corpus jurisdiction only 
reaches the “district of confinement,” including when military had custody of the detainee 
as an “enemy combatant”). 
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involving habeas petitions filed by the lawyers of a number of the 
Guantanamo detainees.86  The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the 
federal courts did have jurisdiction to hear the habeas claims of the 
detainees, as well as other related claims under domestic and, more 
important, international law.87  The Court rejected the Bush 
Administration’s argument that the United States did not have 
jurisdiction over Guantanamo, stating that the detainees were under 
the ‘complete and exclusive control and jurisdiction’ of the United 
States, no other state’s laws applied to them, and they did have a 
right to challenge that their “custody. . .[was in] violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”88 
Of course, there was immediate pushback by the Bush 
Administration, which quickly established the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to circumvent the habeas proceedings 
in federal courts.  The Supreme Court decided two later cases on 
Guantanamo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld89 and Boumediene v. Bush.90  In 
2006, the Court decided in Hamdan that although the government 
could establish military commissions, they had to conform to the 
international laws of war and to requirements on courts martial 
under the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice.91  The 
Commissions, as constituted, did neither, and hence were 
unlawful.92  The final case decided by the Supreme Court in the 
 
 86 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear claims on the legality of the detention of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, 
a territory over which the US “exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 
‘ultimate sovereignty’”). 
 87 Id. at 472–73 (describing petitioners’ claims of violations of domestic and 
international law and reversing a decision that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction 
over these claims). 
 88 Id. at 480, 494–95, 498–99 (detailing why detention on Guantanamo Bay is subject 
to federal court jurisdiction). 
 89 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that that the military 
commission that tried a Guantanamo Bay detainee did not have power to move forward 
because its structure and procedures violated the US Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
the Geneva Conventions). 
 90 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (finding the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 acted to unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus, as procedures set 
up by the to review the status of detainees at Guantanamo were inadequate to substitute 
for habeas corpus). 
 91 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. at 592–95 (explaining why the President’s 
power to convene military commissions is subject to the limitation of the U.S. Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and the law of war). 
 92 See id. at 567 (“[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try 
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Guantanamo litigation during this period was Boumediene v. Bush, 
which found unlawful the procedures set up by Congress in the 
Military Commissions and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.93  
Congress has had the last word, however, and the 
military commissions under the latest version of the military 
commission’s law are the only courts adjudicating the remaining 
Guantanamo cases.94 
While the domestic habeas litigation and other challenges were 
making their way through United States domestic courts, a parallel 
battle was being waged in the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 
behalf of the Guantanamo detainees.  The IACHR’s interventions 
began as early as 2002 with the issuance of the first precautionary 
measures on behalf of all the detainees.95  In Detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, the Commission reviewed claims that the 
arbitrary, incommunicado and prolonged detention, unlawful 
interrogation, and trials by military commission violated the 
American Declaration to which the United States was bound.  It 
ordered precautionary measures against the United States, requiring 
that the detainees’ status be adjudicated through a competent 
 
Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the 
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.”). 
 93 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 733, 736 (finding that the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 barred federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions of Guantanamo 
detainees, with no adequate substitute). 
 94 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq. (2012). What we 
now know about the Guantanamo detainees has been revealed through the hard work of 
lawyers, intrepid journalists, activists, and a few of the detainees themselves who have 
managed to publish their stories. Among the critical information: 55% of the detainees 
have committed no hostile acts against the US; only 5% of the detainees were seized and 
taken into custody by US personnel on the battlefield; 86% of the detainees were arrested 
and turned into US military custody by Pakistani or Afghan individuals for a $5,000 bounty 
per head; of the over 700 people who have gone through Guantanamo as prisoners, only 
10 have been charged with war crimes. The remaining hundreds of detainees were not 
charged with any crimes, and about 40 are now in their 16th year of detention at 
Guantanamo under the Executive’s claim that they are enemy combatants and can be held 
indefinitely or until the end of the global war on terrorism—whenever that might be. See 
Guantanamo by the Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (2012), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers 
[https://perma.cc/EC5C-YRWL]. 
 95 Persons Detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Provisional Measures, 
Report No. 259/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (2002); extension of PM 259/02 (2005); 
extension of PM 259/02 (2013). 
2019 PAST AS PRESENT 415 
tribunal.  The United States ignored the precautionary measures and 
rejected the Commission’s jurisdiction.  The Commission continued 
to renew its precautionary measures multiple times, up to ten years 
after their first issuance.  In addition to the collective precautionary 
measures, the IACHR issued precautionary measures in the 
individual Guantanamo detainee cases of Omar Khadr, Djamel 
Ameziane, and Moath al-Alwi, and heard and granted a number of 
individual petitions from the detainees.  The Commission held 
multiple hearings over the years on the rights of the detainees, 
conditions of detention, and access to judicial review.  It also 
repeatedly requested access to Guantanamo Bay to monitor the 
conditions of detention.  All IACHR interventions were refused or 
rejected by the United States.96 
Despite the constitutional foundation for the decisions in Rasul 
and Hamdi, the U.S. Constitution provided minimal support for the 
detainees’ claims. The Court did not even address the torture claims, 
as the cases were fundamentally about the lack of access to judicial 
review. The strength of the Supreme Court’s decisions and the 
constitutional rights involved were undermined by the executive 
and legislative actions that instituted parallel adjudications through 
the CSRTs that failed to provide the minimal due process guarantees 
that the Geneva Conventions and international law would require.  
The international legal arguments were ultimately unable to change 
the outcomes for the Guantanamo litigants, either, particularly on 
the fundamental norm to be free from torture.  The prohibition 
against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment is unquestionably a jus cogens norm—prohibited for all 
states under all circumstances.97  The Convention against Torture 
prohibits both the use of torture and the removal, transfer or 
extradition of a person to any country where she risks being 
 
 96 See INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., TOWARDS THE CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO, U.N. 
Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 20/15 (June 3, 2015). 
 97 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949; 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment arts. 1, 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; U.S. CONST. art. 8. 
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subjected to torture.  U.N. bodies and experts reinforced the cluster 
of obligations underpinning the prohibition of torture with respect 
to the Guantanamo detainees, including the prohibition of 
incommunicado detention, the use of evidence obtained by torture, 
and the requirement to prosecute and punish all those officials 
engaged in torture.98  While the binding nature of the obligations is 
clear, the United States instituted policies intended to circumvent its 
obligations not to engage in torture and used the DOJ’s OLC, DOD 
and military orders as cover to undermine its international 
commitment not to torture.  Although the official ‘torture policy’ 
was rescinded by the Obama Administration,99 no official has been 
charged for engaging in torture, and many of the policies 
circumventing robust review of detainee treatment remain in place 
as of this writing. 
V. Limitations to the Use of International law in Refugee and 
Immigration Cases 
In reviewing the outcomes of the strategies that have been tried, 
one can only conclude that the news is disheartening.  In some ways 
it seems that the gains that were made on some of the strategies have 
been reversed; in other ways it seems that some of these hard-fought 
victories have been completely wiped out and advocates must start 
again.  For the Central American cases, international legal 
arguments got no traction, even in that most immigration-friendly 
of courts, the Ninth Circuit.  The outcome of the Haitian refugee 
litigation was similarly dismal for both the applicants and for 
adherence to international legal interpretations of the Refugee 
 
 98 See, e.g., LEILA ZERROUGUI ET AL., UN WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY 
DETENTION, SITUATION OF THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 
(2006); see also Letter from Juan Mendez, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Ben 
Emmerson, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism, Monica 
Pinto, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indep. of the Judiciary, Seong-Phil Hong, Chair-
Rapporteur of the U.N. Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det., and Michael Georg Link, Dir. of 
the OSCE Office for Democratic Insts. and Human Rights to the Gov’t of the U.S. on the 
Occasion of the 14th Anniversary of the Opening of the Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Facility, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRTorture/OpenLetterGTMOJan11_2016.docx 
[https://perma.cc/7BAA-9VAY]. 
 99 See Joby Warrick  & Karen DeYoung, Obama Reverses Bush Policies on 
Detention and Interrogation, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012201527.html [https://perma.cc/34P3-7K35]. 
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Convention/Protocol.   
As for the Arab/Muslim immigrant and refugee cases, the secret 
evidence litigation strategies were marginally successful on the 
international law arguments about the persecution bar.  In fact, they 
were not even attempted in the many habeas proceedings brought to 
free the two dozen clients subjected to secret evidence in their cases.  
In terms of Guantanamo, the complexity of the issues and lack of 
proximity to Guantanamo Bay has meant that the public 
understands very little of the fundamental rights at stake, making it 
difficult for the legal strategies to tie into widespread civil society 
activism.  None of the interventions from the international 
mechanisms—including the Inter-American Commission’s 
decisions—made a dent in the policies towards the detainees.  
Despite the really rather astonishing decisions by the Supreme 
Court on the application and relevance of international humanitarian 
and human rights law, overall there has been serious damage to 
constitutional and international law protections by the Guantanamo 
cases, particularly on the fundamental guarantee to be free from 
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
As this snapshot of earlier efforts to defend against the excesses 
of executive power shows, there are significant barriers to the use 
of international legal strategies in refugee and immigration-related 
cases.  Primary among the barriers is the disregard by the federal 
and administrative courts of Article VI of the Constitution.100  
Despite the clarity of Article VI, section 2, and the early Supreme 
Court decisions relying on it, jurisprudential doctrines such as self-
executing treaties,101 political question,102 sovereign immunity, and 
act of state doctrines routinely defeat the application of both treaty 
and customary international law obligations in United States courts.  
The political question doctrine has been a particularly aggressive 
tool used by the federal courts and the government alike to refuse to 
hear the merits of cases that the government finds politically or 
ideologically unpalatable.  In recent cases under the Alien Tort 
 
 100 US CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any 
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 101 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
 102 See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Mujica I), 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1164 
(C.D. Cal. 2005). 
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Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA)—claims which are grounded squarely on international 
human rights law norms—courts have been willing to assert the 
political question doctrine to pretermit claims on the merits relating 
human rights abuses. This has been so, even in cases where the 
government itself has not raised the objection, with courts reaching 
out on their own to invite the State Department to submit letters of 
interest to bar jurisdiction on political question grounds.  Three 
cases brought under the ATCA illustrate the point: Corrie v. 
Caterpillar,103 Belhas v. Ya’alon,104 and Matar v. Dichter.105  Each 
of these cases is a saga on its own, but the main point is that they 
were brought on international law as well as domestic law theories 
for victims of Israeli defendants or policies, and all were dismissed 
on sovereign immunity or political question grounds on the courts’ 
own initiative. 
Related to the setting aside of  clear constitutional instruction of 
the primacy of international treaty law, the fact that the United 
States is party to few of the core international human rights treaties 
in the first place remains a significant barrier.  Aside from the few 
human rights treaties the United States has signed, it has ratified 
even fewer.  Of the dozen most widely-ratified human rights and 
humanitarian law treaties relevant to the issues in this discussion, 
the United States has ratified six.106  Nor has the United States 
 
 103 Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that a suit against a 
company that sold bulldozers to the IDF to demolish homes in the Palestinian Territories 
was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine). 
 104 Belhas v. Moshe Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of 
a suit against a retired general of the IDF for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 105 Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of a claim against 
the former head of the Israeli Security Agency for IDF bombings in Gaza, finding the 
defendant immune as a former officer under common law principles, and thus not reaching 
the question of whether he is also immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 106 The most widely-ratified treaties on human rights and humanitarian law are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC); the Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women (CEDAW); 
the Genocide Convention; the Convention against Torture (CAT); the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute); the Four Geneva Conventions (GC 1-IV); 
and the two Protocols Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions (AP I and II). Of these, 
the U.S. is party only to the ICCPR, the Genocide and CAT Conventions and the Four 
Geneva Conventions. It is now the only country in the world that is not party to the CRC 
and is one of very few non-state parties to the CEDAW and the Rome Statute (185 states 
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ratified the core regional human rights treaty attached to the OAS 
Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights, although its 
argument on non-applicability of the American human rights 
instruments is highly questionable and not accepted by the Inter-
American human rights bodies or most states in the region.107  
Moreover, it has made limiting reservations to those few it has 
ratified that undermine the core obligations under the treaty.  For 
example, the most common reservation the United States has made 
to its ratification of human rights treaties is that they are not self-
executing.108  The second most common reservation (or 
‘declarations and understandings’ as the United States creatively 
terms what the human rights bodies include as reservations) is that 
the U.S. Constitution is supreme over any treaty obligation.109  
These common reservations put the United States in a directly 
opposing trajectory to the international consensus on the binding 
nature of treaties, and the fundamental rules that domestic law 
cannot be used to defeat treaty obligations and reservations are 
 
parties and 108 states parties respectively). Although not widely-ratified, the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (CMW) is highly relevant to this discussion on protections of migrants in the 
United States, to which the US is not a party. 
 107 The United States has consistently taken the position that it is not bound by either 
the American Convention on Human Rights or the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man because it has not ratified the first and the second is not a binding treaty. 
The Inter-American Commission has categorically rejected the second argument, 
explaining that the main instruments incorporated directly into the OAS Charter under its 
provisions are the Statute and Regulations of the IACHR and the American Declaration. 
The IACHR statutes and the Charter provide that the IACHR is the organ of the OAS 
having the jurisdiction to promote the human rights norms binding in the region, and those 
norms are incorporated into the American Declaration for states that are not parties to the 
American Convention on Human Rights. See Charter of the Organization of American 
States arts. 3, 16, 51, 112 & 150. For a detailed explanation of the Commission’s position 
on this, see Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
23/81, OEA Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981). 
 108 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race 
Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 321, 339 (2010) 
(“[T]he United States has generally included ‘non-self-execution’ declarations within its 
ratification of human rights treaties. These declarations are designed to prevent the treaties 
from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implementing legislation.”). 
 109 For example, reservation 2 to the Genocide Convention states, “[N]othing in the 
Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of 
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United 
States.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 
IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
420 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
invalid if they defeat the object and purpose of the treaty itself. 
International law obligations on treaty interpretation appear in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty the 
United States Supreme Court routinely cites as customary law, but 
to which the United States is not a party.110  The Supreme Court 
doctrine that interprets a relevant treaty through the lens of domestic 
law fundamentally subverts widely accepted treaty law interpretive 
rules.  Under the VCLT, a state cannot “invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”111  
Moreover, a state must refrain from defeating the object and 
purpose of a treaty when the state has signed a treaty and pending 
its entry into force “provided that such entry into force is not unduly 
delayed.”112  A similar rule applies for reservations: reservations are 
considered invalid if incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the treaty.113  Unfortunately, U.S. position and practice put it 
directly at odds with these rules.114 
A direct consequence of the subversion of the rules of 
international law and the Constitution that place treaty and 
 
 110 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. For a sample of decisions citing and discussing obligations to interpret 
treaties consistently with the VCLT, see De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 
(2d Cir. 2008); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001); Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 390–91 (2006); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de 
C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Pliego v. Hayes, 843 F.3d 226, 232 (6th Cir. 2016); 
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F. 1279, 1296 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 111 VCLT, supra note 110, at art. 27. 
 112 Id. at art. 18. This provision is particularly applicable for treaties that the U.S. has 
signed but ratification has been pending for years if not decades. See, e.g., International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, signed in 1977 but not ratified; 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, signed in 1980 but not 
ratified; Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 1995 but not ratified; Additional 
Protocol I and II to the Geneva Convention, signed in 1977, but not ratified; American 
Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1977 but not ratified. 
 113 VCLT, supra note 110, at art. 19. 
 114 U.S. courts apply the ‘last in time’ and ‘compatibility’ interpretive rules, but these 
are inconsistent with the Constitution’s Supremacy clause and the VCLT rules cited above. 
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An act of 
Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international 
agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule 
or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly 
reconciled.”). On the obligation to interpret domestic and international law provisions in a 
manner that ensures compatibility, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 115, cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
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customary international law equally enforceable as domestic law, is 
the undermining of the principle that international law cannot be 
interpreted on the basis of domestic law, but the other way around.  
This methodology is what determined the outcome in Stevic, 
Cardoza-Fonseca, and Sale, in which the United States Supreme 
Court paradoxically interpreted the Refugee Protocol provisions to 
defeat the U.S.’s fundamental obligations under the treaty: that is, 
that all refugees are entitled to the guarantee of non-refoulement; 
that all refugees must be guaranteed the right to access asylum; and 
that no state can return a refugee coming under its jurisdiction to 
refoulement. Justice Blackmun explained this backwards reasoning 
in a scathing dissent in Sale, and expanded on the deeper domestic 
versus international law problem in a later law journal article. His 
explanation is worth quoting at length: 
 
In construing Sec. 243(h) and Article 33.1 in Haitian Centers 
Council, the Court once again failed to respect its first principles 
of international law. Turning first to the statute, the Court 
remarkably applied a presumption against extraterritoriality of 
Sec. 243(h) without considering the fact that the statute was 
enacted pursuant to a multilateral treaty, and without 
acknowledging the primacy of the principle of non-refoulement in 
customary international law. The Court thus ignored a maxim 
recognized since Schooner Charming Betsy: an Act of Congress 
and particularly a statute enacted pursuant to a treaty ought never 
to be construed to violate a coextensive treaty or otherwise to 
contract customary international law . . . .Having established that 
Sec. 243(h) does not apply beyond US borders, the Court then 
reasoned backwards to construe the language of Article 33.1—a 
global convention—in light of its interpretation of American 
immigration law. The language of Article 33.1 absolutely 
prohibits the “return’ of any refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever,’ 
without geographical limitation. “The Supreme Court 
nevertheless concluded that the prohibition applies only after a 
refugee successfully enters US territory.115 
 
This backwards logic permeates United States Supreme Court 
and federal court decisions in the cases discussed here.  This 
 
 115 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 
39, 44 (1994). 
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incongruent methodology contributed to the inability of advocates 
in all these cases to rely on bedrock international norms that could 
challenge United States government actions that violated refugee-
related guarantees of non-refoulement, access to asylum, and 
international interpretations of the refugee definition in the Central 
American cases of the 1980s.  It also undermined the ability of 
advocates to bring international law to bear to the litigation in the 
secret evidence cases of the 1990s.  It prevented advocates from 
successfully challenging U.S. obligations not to engage in torture, 
cruel and inhuman treatment in the Guantanamo and other post-9/11 
terrorism-related cases.  Were the federal courts to respect the 
primacy of international legal interpretations, international due 
process guarantees including prohibiting the use of secret evidence 
might have halted the erosion of rights that continue to be eroded in 
the present.116 
Finally, the lack of U.S. adherence to its obligations as a 
member state in the Organization of American States towards the 
Inter-American human rights system has been a major barrier to 
more consistency between U.S. actions and implementation of 
international legal norms.  In the Central American crisis of the 
1980s, the Arab/Muslim targeting of the 1990s, and the 
Guantanamo detainee situation, the IACHR was proactive and 
responsive to the multiple legal violations raised by civil society—
lawyers and activists alike.  Its efforts fell on deaf ears due to the 
entrenched position of the United States that it is not bound to the 
American human rights instruments or to the jurisdiction of the 
human rights bodies. 
VI.  The Relevance of Re-Visiting International Law in the 
Current Crises 
The current moment is in many ways a reprise of what was 
experienced in the immigrant and refugee communities and by their 
advocates in the 1980s and 1990s.  Right now, the renewed assault 
on immigrants and refugees is occurring through policies similar to 
those challenged in earlier decades.  The Muslim ban and refugee 
restrictions in the United States, however, are having massive 
 
 116 For a persuasive review of US treaty obligations that could support challenges to 
the government abuses in the secret evidence cases, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global 
Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can Reform our Immigration 
System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2008). 
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negative consequences for millions more people around the world 
than ever before. 
Today, the world is grappling with the greatest refugee crisis 
ever faced, yet the United States has completely abdicated its role 
and legal responsibilities.117  The United States has pulled out of the 
Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants,118 and the Trump 
Administration has reduced the 110,000 refugee quota of the Obama 
Administration to 30,000—the lowest on record.119  Moreover, less 
than half of those will succeed in overcoming the ‘extreme vetting’ 
that has been put in place.  So far, only 12 Syrian refugees have been 
resettled in the United States during 2018-19, of the more than 5.6 
million Syrians hosted in mostly a few Middle Eastern host states.120   
The new ‘extreme vetting’ process is making it impossible for even 
approved refugees in the pipeline to succeed in traveling to the 
United States. 
Parallel to the limited effect international human rights and 
international humanitarian law has had in challenging the worst of 
U.S. policies towards refugees and immigrants, even in the more 
robust international law environment in Europe, core international 
law norms are rapidly eroding.  For example, the research on the 
Syrian crisis in the frontline host states has found that their 
originally incredibly generous open-door policies have become 
closed-door policies towards the refugees in the last few years.121  
 
 117 See Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/7JVH-JRVT] (“We are 
now facing the highest levels of displacement on record.”). 
 118 See Patrick Wintour, Donald Trump Pulls US out of UN Global Compact on 
Migration, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-
global-compact-on-migration [https://perma.cc/KE8T-6MCX]. 
 119 See Lesley Wroughton, U.S. to Sharply Limit Refugee Flows to 30,000 in 2019, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeo-
idUSKCN1LX2HS [https://perma.cc/992N-T9EG]; Joel Rose, Trump Administration to 
Drop Refugee Cap to 45,000, Lowest in Years, NPR (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/27/554046980/trump-administration-to-drop-refugee-cap-
to-45-000-lowest-in-years [https://perma.cc/3M2D-DSP2]. 
 120 See Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR. (Dec. 31, 2018), 
www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/ [https://perma.cc/A6SX-7JHU]. 
      121 See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, The Nativists Won Europe, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/europe-refugees-syria-
borders/585097/ [https://perma.cc/NX8H-2LHF] (“European Union data released 
Thursday showed that the number of asylum seekers in the bloc declined for the fourth 
straight year.”).  
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This phenomenon has echoed in the pushback policies of the 
frontline European Union states.  For example, Greece and 
Bulgaria, which had no history of detaining refugees, have turned 
to constructing detention centers of isolating immigrants and 
refugees in closed area ‘hotspots’ to contain huge numbers of 
immigrants and refugees, preventing them from free access to 
asylum.122 
But international human rights norms are even more relevant 
and necessary today.  Among the needed strategies are norms to 
address statelessness among migrant and refugee populations across 
the world, including within the United States.  It is more important 
than ever to focus on historical root causes, including United States 
policies in Central America that have created the push factors 
forcing thousands of individuals trying to enter to apply for asylum, 
and the concomitant international obligations the United States has 
towards ensuring the right to asylum for them.  Equally critical is 
incorporating international norms in addressing the human rights 
crisis in migration, including the crisis of thousands of disappeared 
migrants from the Northern Triangle, and formulating transnational 
and international solutions in partnership with the families of the 
disappeared.  Reviewing the lessons of the past, it is true that there 
has been little success in the efforts to build international human 
rights norms in advocacy work for refugees and immigrants. 
However, it is also obvious that the U.S. domestic constitutional 
framework has been woefully insufficient to protect the rights of the 
most vulnerable refugee and immigrant populations and that 
integrating international law norms into the domestic legal defense 
toolbox is more urgent than ever. 
 
 
 122 See Bulgaria 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/ 
[https://perma.cc/QG4Z-JME9]; see also Greece 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/ 
[https://perma.cc/E62M-78MP]. 
